Wall St.

July 16, 2008

WFC Lays Bear Trap on Wall St.

Lgbwellsfargo_3 Today's Wall Street darling is a little old bank from the left coast, Wells Fargo.  The transcontinental horse-back messenger service bank, largely expected to begin an arduous write-off period, surprised analysts by beating their ever sage estimates guesses by $.03 (.53 v .50 est).  The stock bounced 30% on the news.  Unfortunately, WFC's earnings are actually a mine field waiting to blow the legs off some unwitting retail investor.

Most notably, Wells Fargo changed their charge-off policy this quarter for home equity mortgages.  Traditionally they recognized losses after 120 days; now it's 180 days.  Oh, and did I mention they did it to protect homeowners?  From page 4 of their 8-K:

“...the Home Equity charge-off policy changed in the second quarter from 120 days to no more than 180 days to provide more time to work with customers to solve their credit problems and keep them in their homes. The Company has helped nearly 900 customers, and approximately $90 million of Home Equity loans have been modified due to this change."

I know what you must should be asking yourself: what effect did this have on their earnings.  Curiously you have to turn to the next page for that information, divided into two paragraphs, which surely was for clarity obfuscation.

"The policy change had the effect of deferring an estimated $265 million of charge-offs from the second quarter…”

Continue reading "WFC Lays Bear Trap on Wall St." »

July 15, 2008

We've Seen This Before

Hey, remember the time large financial entities, implicitly backed a market's liquidity?  The whole problem was created by a duration mis-match between assets and liabilities.  To "serve their clients", provide "temporary relief" and mainain an "orderly market in times of strain" the banks backstopped the rollovers when the regular buyers ceased to come back for more.

I remember.

It worked for awhile.  Until it didn't.

Just a thought.

John Devaney's Yact is John Devaney's Yacht No More

Le_douchebag John Devaney, he of the former United Capital Management (and ubiquitous douchey photos posing in front of his various toys), has not only surrendered to inevitability but - and it pains me to say this - sold his prized yacht, Positive Carry.  The new owner?  Futuristic Charters, LLC, a Florida company with principal offices in Hoboken, NJ.  Interestingly enough, the offices of said charter company happen to be at the exact same address of the Academy Bus Company.  More interestingly, Francis Tedesco, President of Academy, is the signer on the LLC Agreement filed with the State.  As if it weren't bad enough that this poor ship has passed from the elite hands of a top hedge fund manager into those of a grease monkey bus operator, Tedesco even had the temerity to rename the boat "Espresso III".   

I'm not sure whats going on with that name, but I think we can all agree that it just doesn't have the same fate-tempting ring as its former title.

For what its worth, the boat appears to be currently docked at the Newport Marina in Jersey City, NJ, should any of our more ambitious readers be interested in hopping the PATH to go check her out.

July 12, 2008

Bondholders 2 - Taxpayers -365,743

Some Generally companies facing insolvency don't see their debt climb...

NEW YORK, July 11 (Reuters) - Debt of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac  soared in their best one-day gain in history on Friday amid speculation that a government takeover of the housing giants would make the bonds more like ultra-safe U.S. Treasuries...

...But that also means a credit-quality downgrade for U.S. Treasury debt, which slumped, investors said.

Thank god I get the junk Fannie and Freddie trade in for the t-bills.


UPDATE: In you haven't seen it, i present to you the first page of any Fannie Mae prospectus (emphasis theirs!):

Fannie Mae Guaranty

We guarantee that the holders of the certificates will receive timely payments of interest and principal. We alone are responsible for making payments under our guaranty. The certificates and payments of principal and interest on the certificates are not guaranteed by the United States, and do not constitute a debt or obligation of the United States or any of its agencies or instrumentalities other than Fannie Mae.

Sage Saturday Wisdom

Email from a friend this AM (in response to this article):

I love this: "But this is a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity for valuations, for all financials. When we look back historically, we will be writing about the irrational panic of 2007 and 2008."

 Are you kidding me? A 25% decline in the value of the  US housing market. A near collapse of the financial system as we know it. The second largest bank failure in UShistory. And as per Bloomberg, $410.1 BILLION of writedowns and credit losses.

Yeah, FNM was a once in a lifetime opportunity at $20, BSC at $60.

Amen.

July 10, 2008

Setting the Record Straight: Taxpayers Are NOT Funding JPM's Buyout of Bear Stearns

Since news of its imminent collapse and the actions of the Federal Reserve to prevent it, much of the criticism heaped upon JP Morgan’s takeout of Bear Stearns has revolved around whether it amounts to a taxpayer-funded bailout of Wall Street. Countless media reports would have their readers believe that this is indeed the case, but I have yet to read a single compelling explanation of how exactly this is the case. It does not take much effort to stoke the populist fire by quoting anonymous sources or citing vague ‘reports’ supporting this conclusion. To date, not a single account I have read attacks the crux of the matter, which is to explain the mechanisms, or under what circumstances taxpayer funds were, or could be used to fund the transaction.


I’ve scoured information on the Federal Reserve’s website and spoken with respected authorities on the subject, none of which suggest that taxpayers are footing the bill for the transaction. The likelihood that taxpayer funds will every be used at all is slim-to-none. One source I spoke with, a respected Finance Professor (of Markets & Banking, among other subjects) went so far as to say that he doesn’t expect either JPM or the Fed to take any significant loss as a result of the Bear deal when all is said-and-done.


Before anyone jumps down my neck, let me elaborate.


Two weeks ago the Fed released its quarterly update of the collateral pledged against its loan to JPM was marked down to $28.9 Bn from ~$30 bn when the loan was first made. Maturities on the assets pledged extend out 10-20 years or more, according to what I’ve seen, although the Fed is relatively mum on the exact composition of the portfolio.


To illustrate what would happen in an extreme case, lets consider a semi-arbitrary situation in which the default rate on the pledged assets is 100% (which is very unlikely, baring global financial catastrophe or something on that scale), with zero recovery on any assets, spread out evenly over 15 years. In this example, these are not simply mark-to-market accounting losses (how they’ll actually show), but economic losses, just to illustrate the point. In this example, the Fed will have to absorb ~$2bn per year over that 15 year period, a figure which may seem extreme, but as I’ll explain, is relatively insignificant in the grand scheme of things.


In “Purposes & Functions of the Federal Reserve”, pp. 11, it states:

The income of the Federal Reserve System is derived primarily from the interest on U.S. government securities that it has acquired through open market operations. Other major sources of income are the interest on foreign currency investments held by the System; interest on loans to depository institutions; and fees received for services provided to deposi­tory institutions, such as check clearing, funds transfers, and automated clearinghouse operations.

“Ok, BFD, so what?” you say. Relax my young padawan, for the truth shall set you free:

After it pays its expenses, the Federal Reserve turns the rest of its earn­ings over to the U.S. Treasury. About 95 percent of the Reserve Banks’ net earnings have been paid into the Treasury since the Federal Reserve System began operations in 1914. (Income and expenses of the Federal Reserve Banks from 1914 to the present are included in the Annual Report of the Board of Governors.) In 2003, the Federal Reserve paid approxi­mately $22 billion to the Treasury.

In 2007 this number was $38.7bn, up from $29.1bn in 2006 (pp. 360 of the report). Even if we take the low number from 2003, the $2bn annual loss from the above extreme example would only represent less than a 10% hit to the funds contributed to the Treasury by the Fed.


For those who still don’t get it, let me explain. While the Fed is funded and overseen by Congress, it is “private within the Government;” it is effectively a self-funded entity operating as a “private” organization within Government. The loan extended by the Fed to JPM (via Maiden Lane, LLC) was a direct extension of credit from the Fed’s balance sheet, not from an appropriate of taxpayer monies, which so far as I can tell, would have required specific Congressional action.


When this information is taken in its entirety the only possible “hit” to taxpayers would be a budgetary shortfall resulting from poor budgetary planning (e.g. if the budget was based on receiving X dollars from the Fed, only to actually receive X minus whatever “loss” the Fed absorbed from collateral losses in the Bear collateral). Even in this situation, taxpayers still are not actually funding any part of the transaction, only the foregone funds – which were never a certainty to begin with – of the difference between the estimated Fed contribution and its actual contribution in a given year.


May I be missing something (or potentially many things)? Absolutely. But all research I’ve done suggests that one thing is certain (or at least as certain as anything can be these days): Taxpayers are NOT funding the purchase (“bailout,” whatever) of Bear Stearns.  Until, or unless someone can provide clear, factual support that this is not the case, journalists, pundits, and even those of us on The Street need to resist the urge to propagate the unsubstantiated claims of those who cannot or will not back up such claims.

Rumor Mongering on Gossip Boards

Ok, so all morning I've been trying to clean this up and make a "real post" out of it, but I'm simply too busy.  My comments from yesterday's Dealbreaker.com debate are below.  There will be a real post to follow, just not this morning.  Please excuse typos, grammar, and poor sentence structure as I have not edited this at all.

First, I set up with John Carney's post in response to Andrew Ross Sorkin's Dealbook post

The basic claim that intentionally spreading falsehoods with the intention of manipulating markets should be illegal is largely irrelevant. This kind of market manipulation is illegal. The question is whether or not we want prosecutors ramping up investigations into rumors and those who spread them. In particular, should prosecutors start aggressively investigating the origins and intentions of rumors that surrounded the crash of Bear Stearns and that have lately been hitting Merrill Lynch and Lehman Brothers. Do we want subpoenas fast as rumors circulate?...

...What's more, the costs of such investigations would likely be worse than the alleged wrong-doing. In order to catch wrong-doers, prosecutors would have to subpoena the private emails, instant messages and testimony of lots of people who did no wrong at all. Each of the investigated would face huge legal bills and know that their lives could be ruined by a prosecutor or a judge who misreads a bad intention into an innocent email. (ed. this doesn't really set up my comments well, so i recommend checking DB yourself.)

Now, my comments...

Need i ask it again?

WHY IS IT ONLY MARKET MANIPULATION WHEN IT'S SHORT A COMPANY??

No one goes off and attacks those who perpetuate rumors about the "wicked" (technical term) new product Apple is coming out with, or unsubstantiated claims that there are "interested suitors" waiting to take over a firm. So long as the price movement is up no one cares--except for the people who buy the rumors and get killed on the inevitable fall after such rumors fail to pass. If anything, that "market manipulation" is praised when it is one in the same. But who is going to prosecute the "rumor mongerers" then? The company got a bump to it's stock price, the analyst with a buy (buys do dominate sell ratings) rating was vindicated, and whoever threw the rumor out there got his profit. But, when a stock is "forced" down the management is p-ssed, institutional owners are p-ssed, and analysts refute the rumors to save face. It's the penultimate (behind prop trading) asymmetric payout structure.

Again, as Einhorn said, "if you're company can't withstand a hit to its share price it probably isn't a viable ongoing concern". (Read his book, trust me).

Enron wasn't crushed by short sellers, short sellers found that Enron was a cheat and a liar; same with bsc. Overstock's plan of "losing money on every sale but making up for it in volume" wasn't unviable because rumors floated based on insidious short selling conspiracies...it just wasn't a profitable business model and people recognized it .

In the end it's pretty simple, if a firm thinks it's shares have been pushed artificially low, then they (and their insiders) should probably stock up knowing they will be vindicated. It's a great chance to profit...if your firm is actually well capitalized.

Now i know what's coming, "but these rumors can hurt the financial system by causing bank run". Yes and no. If it is nothing more than market rumor then two things: 1) a pretty good way to quash the rumor would be to come clean about everything on your balance sheet to allay concerns (sunlight is the best disinfectant), unless you're LEH and the concerns may be valid; and 2) if you're a commercial bank (i.e., a "run" in the traditional sense) the market rumors generally won't spark a run because main st. is not a prop desk on wall st., they don't get the rumors passed down to them in the blink of an eye. Now, if you still think that the "runs" are the problem ("runs" are always a problem) then tell me WHAT RUN ON A BANK WASN'T ULTIMATELY VINDICATED?

Anytime someone starts yelling about short-seller conspiracies sell everything you can and run. Jamie Dimon was right, "where there's smoke there's usually fire".

Followed by...

And will someone tell ARS to get off his fucking high horse? His suggestion about "getting to the originator of the rumor, and their intent" poses a few problems for he himself. So, let's say someone passes him a note that Citi is going bankrupt, supplies a modicum of evidence, and says leave him unidentified. ARS publishes it as a "market rumor" because, well, that's his job. The whole thing turns out to be completely false. NY AG calls and asks him who sent him the rumor, since, ARS has already publically stated that, to him, the most important goal of regulators should be finding out who originated the rumor. ARS tells the NY AG to fuck off because he's protecting his sources. Yada yada. The best part is that ARS would presumably argue that "if he disclosed his sources then he wouldn't be able to report the goings on in the market because no one would disclose information to him; it would curtail his right to free speech and ability to act for efficient market dissemination of information".

That's a scene i would love to see.

June 23, 2008

Wall Street Analyst Immortalized with New Opera

Das_reingold Confessions of a Wall Street Analyst author Dan Reingold (the Luke Skywalker to Jack Grubman's Darth Vader) has been given arguably the biggest honor that any 'Streeter could ever hope to achieve:  his life's work made into an opera, Das Reingold to be preformed by the famed New York Metropolitan Opera.

In a story "traversing the realms of nymphs (uh...), dwarves (Grubman), gods (Weill), and giants (Ebbers), the Opera highlights all of the seemingly-unbelievable details of the life of the former star telecom Analyst.

Das Reingold shows in March and April, 2009.  Tickets go on sale this August at www.metopera.com

June 17, 2008

The Apple Ad That, uh, Never Quite Made it

Ibanker

June 06, 2008

Finance Meets Fashion, or not.

Last night I winged-up with fellow commenter Investor Cluzzo at Pocketchange NYC: Finance Meets Fashion. Investor Cluzzo did a great recap on behalf of Dealbreaker (Bess asked us both to attend, and I can't turn down her beauty or witt).  I highly recommend you read his synopsis, but I had to add my two cents on the comment boards:

I'm still waiting to see the Post's recount of the event though. Let's just say Bill Ackman and David Einhorn made appearances and had some great one liners. Whether they saw through my facade (doubtful), didn't think anyone in the post would get my jokes (50/50), or they themselves had no clue what it meant to be "long CDS on interns" or arguing that the "fashion girls must have shopped their ratings around town because there's no way any of them were investment grade" I'll never know.

Also, best exchange from the International Intimates girl:
Girl: "Victoria's Secret outsources 65% of their underwear designs, and do 55% internally."
Me: "Do you mean 65/35 or 55/45?"
Girl: "Oh, yea, 65/45"
Me: "That's still not an option"
Girl: "Why not?"
Me: "Math"
Girl: Embarrased and clearly still not comprehending why she's wrong "oh yea, haha, totally"
Me: "So which is it then?"
Girl: "What's what?"
Me: "Nevermind.  I need a drink."

C'est la vie.

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